





Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) t authorizes courts to order
parties to litigation not to disseminate information obtained in civil dis-
covery.2 Rule 26(c) requires a party seeking this type of order to show
"good cause" why it should be issued.3 The purpose of such protective
orders is to restrain the expression of the ordered party. This restraint
raises difficult first amendment questions. Few courts have discussed
the extent to which the first amendment protects discovery information,
or the circumstances in which protective orders prohibiting dissemina-
tion are constitutionally permissible. Those courts that have discussed
these issues have used inconsistent approaches and have reached radi-
cally different results.
Recently the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ad-
dressed the question extensively in In re Halkin.4 Over a sharp dissent,
the Halkin court found a first amendment right to disseminate discov-
ery information, and it set forth a three-part test for assessing the con-
stitutionality of protective orders prohibiting such dissemination. The
Halkin test calls for inquiry whether the dissemination poses a threat of
significant harm, whether the protective order is narrowly drawn, and
whether less intrusive alternatives exist for protecting parties and the
public from dissemination. 5 Halkin is the first decision to formulate a
useful standard for determining whether a protective order is constitu-
tional.
The Halkin decision raises two important issues: first, given the
strength of the dissent in Halkin and the inconsistent treatment of the
first amendment interest in other courts, the scope of the first amend-
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1970), hereinafter cited as
WRIGHT & MILLER.
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The rule is set out in full at note 19 infra.
2. See notes 26-28 infra and accompanying text.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See notes 29-39 infra and accompanying text.
4. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
5. The Halkin test is discussed more fully at notes 182-96 infra and accompanying text,
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ment right to disseminate discovery information is still uncertain.6 Sec-
ond, if a party has a constitutional right to disseminate discovery
information, the courts must still determine the circumstances, if any,
in which protective orders prohibiting dissemination are constitutional.
This Comment analyzes each of these problems. The purposes of this
analysis are to show that sound first amendment interpretation compels
recognition of a right to disseminate discovery information, to show
that protective orders prohibiting dissemination of discovery informa-
tion are nevertheless constitutionally permissible under a balancing-of-
interests theory, and to argue that incorporating the Halkin test into the
good cause requirement of Rule 26(c) creates a useful standard for de-
termining whether a protective order prohibiting dissemination may
constitutionally be issued.
I. PROTECTIVE ORDERS PROHIBITING DISSEMINATION:
BACKGROUND
Civil discovery facilitates litigation by providing litigants with ac-
cess to relevant information held by an opposing party.7 The scope of
discovery is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), which
provides for discovery "regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."' 8 Gener-
6. See, e.g., 92 HARV. L. REV. 1550 (1979) (casenote on Halkin criticizing the majority opin-
ion and siding with the dissent on first amendment issues).
7. Before 1938 civil litigation had virtually no discovery process. See WRIGHT & MILLER
§ 2002, at 21. The discovery provisions now in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26-37 were her-
alded as a much needed innovation in federal civil procedure. Justice Murphy, in Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), the seminal decision on the scope of the discovery process, declared:
ITihe deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No
longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, ei-
ther party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.
Id. at 507. The Federal Rules permit litigants to obtain substantial amounts of relevant informa-
tion that otherwise would not be available. This access to relevant information serves numerous
purposes, such as avoiding surprise, disclosing fully the nature and scope of the controversy, nar-
rowing and simplifying issues, and assisting parties in preparation for trial. See WRIGHT &
MILLER § 2001, at 17-18. Moreover, the access made available by discovery is not simply access to
information already held by the courts, but is instead direct access to information held by an
opposing party. When a party resists discovery of information it possesses, rule 37 empowers
judges to order production and apply sanctions for refusal to comply. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
Thus, discovery is a system of access to information created and regulated by the courts, in which
litigating parties are granted liberal access to information held by their opponents in order to
facilitate "the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial." Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. at 501.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or de-
fense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, includ-
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ally, courts construe the discovery rules9 to maximize the availability of
discovery.' 0
Although the discovery process is designed to work with a mini-
mum of judicial intrusion, I" the Federal Rules empower the courts to
regulate access to discovery information by four principal methods.
First, rule 26(b) limits the scope of discovery to relevant information' 2
that is not privileged. 13 Second, the rules prescribe the procedures to be
followed by participants in the discovery process.' 4 Third, rule 26(c)
empowers judges to issue orders to protect parties and witnesses from
abuse or undue hardship occasioned by the discovery process.' 5
Fourth, the rules provide for sanctions applicable against parties failing
to comply with the other discovery rules.' 6 Information held by an op-
posing party is accessible only within the limits of the discovery rules.
Litigants do not possess a "right" of access to discovery information.' 7
ing the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the informa-
tion sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
10. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 507 (1947). See generally WRIGHT & MILLER § 2007. See also Burns v. Thiokol Chemical
Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1973).
11. See 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.02[5], at 26-72 (2d ed. 1979).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) requires that requested information be "relevant to the subject
matter involved in the pending action." "Relevancy" is necessarily vague since the Federal Rules
do not define the term. See Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 58 F.R.D.
348, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); WRIGHT & MILLER § 2008, at 45. The concept of relevancy is inter-
preted liberally. See Association for Women in Science v. Califano, 566 F.2d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Dunbar v. United States, 502 F.2d 506, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally WRIGHIT &
MILLER § 2008, at 45. "Relevancy" does have limits, though. When information sought in dis-
covery could have no conceivable bearing on the subject matter of the litigation, discovery is not
permitted. See, e.g., Jones v. Metzger Dairies, Inc., 334 F.2d 919, 925 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denled,
379 U.S. 965 (1965); In re Fontaine, 402 F. Supp. 1219 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Hawes v. C.E. Cook &
Co., 64 F.R.D. 22 (W.D. Mich. 1974), vacated, 538 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1976). See generally
WRIGHT & MILLER §§ 2008-09.
13. If information would be privileged at trial, it is likewise privileged for discovery purposes.
See WRIGHT & MILLER § 2016. See also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953); South-
ern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 134 (5th Cir. 1968); Oliver v. Committee for Re-election of the
President, 66 F.R.D. 553, 556 (D.D.C. 1975).
14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 27-36.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See note 19 infra.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
17. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834
(1974) (there is no first amendment right of access to information that is not generally available to
the public); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not
carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information").
If a right of access did exist, the rules could not infringe upon that right. The discovery rules
were not meant to infringe upon the substantive rights of the parties. See Schlagenhaufv. Holder,
379 U.S. 104 (1964); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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In discovery a party may be requested to produce confidential in-
formation. For instance, trade secrets, research data, confidential busi-
ness information, or other sensitive material not generally available to
the public may be requested by an adverse party. If the information is
discoverable under rule 26(b)' 8 but the party requested to produce has
an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the information, that
party may move for a protective order pursuant to rule 26(c): "Upon a
motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and
for good cause shown, the court. . . may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense ...."19
If a party seeks protection from dissemination of confidential in-
formation, the court has three alternatives. First, it may deny discovery
altogether. This is plainly permitted by the language of rule 26(c). 20
This type of protection, however, undermines the policy of liberal dis-
covery if the requested information is relevant to the litigation. Deny-
ing discovery protects the one party's confidentiality but deprives his
adversary of information useful in the preparation of his case.21 Sec-
18. See note 8 supra.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) provides in full:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alterna-
tively, on matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is
to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or
more of the following: (1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be
had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place;
(3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected
by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with
no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after being
sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only
in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or infor-
mation enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court may, on
such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or person provide or permit
discovery. The provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in
relation to the motion.
Although rule 26(c) lists eight types of protective orders, it is well settled that the list is merely
illustrative; a court may, in its discretion, fashion any order which justice requires. See WRIHT
& MILLER § 2036, at 269. This is clear from the text of the rule, which expressly authorizes a court
to "make any order. . . including one or more of the following." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (emphasis
added).
20. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c)(1) & (7), set out in full at note 19 supra.
21. See Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck, 61 F.R.D. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1973):
The exercise of the court's discretion must be guided by the liberal federal principles
favoring disclosure, keeping in mind the need to safeguard confidential information
transmitted within the discovery process from disclosures harmful to business interests.
Both sides should have meaningful access to this type of information. . . where it can be
reasonably shown to be "relevant" to the prosecution or defense of a claim.
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ond, the court may compel production without granting a protective
order.22 Absent any judicial order to the contrary, discovery, like other
pretrial proceedings, is "ordinarily to be conducted in public. '23 More-
over, in the absence of a protective order, parties may use discovery
information as they wish.24 Accordingly, when the producing party has
a legitimate interest in preserving the confidentiality of the requested
information, an order compelling production without a protective order
means the producing party must suffer the impact of disclosure or dis-
semination by the party receiving the information. This result is
plainly harsh; the purpose of discovery is effectuated by production
alone,25 not by dissemination. The court's third option is to compel
discovery but to restrict or prohibit dissemination, pursuant to rule
26(c).26 A protective order permitting discovery but prohibiting dis-
Id. at 409. See also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter,
332 F.2d 260, 265 (9th Cir. 1964).
22. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
23. Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 264 (9th Cir. 1964); see Davis v. Romney,
55 F.R.D. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D.
Pa. 1969); G( Publicity in Taking Evidence Act, 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1976); FED. R. CIv. P. 43(a)
(testimony of witnesses must be taken in open court unless a statute or other rule provides other-
wise). See generally Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
24. See Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); ac-
cord, Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
25. See note 7 supra. Given the broad scope and liberal application of the discovery rules,
parties can use discovery simply to extract confidential information from an opposing party. See
48 U. CIN. L. REv. 900, 909 n.40 (1979). Such extrajudicial use of the discovery process is in effect
a judicially enforced invasion of privacy. The discovery rules are meant to aid the litigation proc-
ess, not to permit general extraction of confidential information. Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 501 (1947) ("The new rules ... restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and
invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in thepreparationfor trial . . .The way is
now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain thefullest possible knowl-
edge ofthe issues andfacts be/ore trial") (emphasis added).
This is not to say, however, that dissemination may not serve a useful purpose. Dissemina-
tion of requested information may contribute to the public understanding of important social
affairs. That dissemination does not specifically further the purpose of discovery does not apriorl
compel prohibitions on dissemination. If discovery information touches upon subjects of general
public interest, dissemination may serve a legitimate purpose in informing the public. See, e.g.,
Howard & Crowley, Pleading, Discovery, and Pretrial Procedurefor Litigation Against Government
Spying, 55 U. DET. J. URB. L. 931, 962-63 (1978) (dissemination may be a remedy in its own right
in cases of official misconduct or deprivation of constitutional rights because exposure may force
government officials to stop engaging in unlawful activity). See also 48 U. CIN. L. REv., supra, at
909 n.40 (1979).
Nevertheless, discovery is principally a litigation tool, not a mechanism for forced publication
of confidential information. Dissemination of discovery information does not make litigation
more efficient, or aid in preparation for trial.
26. In most cases in which a party seeks protection of confidential information, the courts
order discovery. "[T]he key issue is not whether the information will be disclosed but under what
conditions." WRIGHT & MILLER § 2043, at 305. The discussion of this section addresses the role
of protective orders prohibiting dissemination of discovery information absent any first amend-
ment considerations.
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semination of the discovery information to third parties satisfies the
liberal disclosure policies underlying the discovery process.27 At the
same time, this type of protective order minimizes the harm to the pro-
ducing party from the release of confidential information. Such an or-
der thus appears to be the best of the available alternatives. Such
orders are, in fact, frequently issued by courts to facilitate discovery
while protecting confidentiality. 28
Protective orders may be issued only upon a motion by a party or
other person from whom discovery is sought and only if the moving
party shows "good cause" why the order should issue.29 What consti-
tutes a showing of good cause depends on the type of protection sought
and the particular facts of the case.30 The decision to grant a protective
order is thus left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.31 Yet a
finding of good cause requires, at a minimum, a clear, specific, factual
demonstration that the party seeking protection will incur serious in-
jury in the absence of protection.32 Precisely how serious the potential
injury must be is unclear, beyond the settled rule that general assertions
of confidentiality or conclusory allegations of potential injury are insuf-
ficient.33 The decisions attempting to set forth the necessary degree of
harm range from requiring that "disclosure will work a clearly defined
and very serious injury,"34 to requiring a "particular and specific dem-
27. See note 7 supra.
28. E.g., Gentron Corp. v. H.C. Johnson Agencies, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 415 (E.D. Wis. 1978);
Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D. 386 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Vollert v. Summa Corp.,
389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308
(E.D. Pa. 1969); Nichols v. Philadelphia Tribune Co., 22 F.R.D. 89 (E.D. Pa. 1958). See also
Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 n.24 (1979), and cases cited therein. The
Merrill case is discussed in Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-
1979, 1980 DUKE L.J. 139, 155-59.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The burden is on the party seeking the order to show good cause.
Kiblen v. Retail Credit Co., 76 F.R.D. 402 (E.D. Wash. 1977); United States v. IBM, 66 F.R.D.
186, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D.
Pa. 1969). See WRIGHT & MILLER § 2036.
30. See Glick v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477, 479 (W.D. Mo. 1950); WRIGHT
& MILLER § 2035, at 266.
31. See Chemical & Indus. Corp. v. Druffel, 301 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1962); Aluminum Co. of
America v. United States Dep't of Justice, 444 F. Supp. 1342, 1346-47 (D.D.C. 1978); Essex Wire
Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
32. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974); United States v..IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Apco Oil Corp.
v. Certified Transp. Co., 46 F.R.D. 428 (W.D. Mo. 1969); WRIGHT & MILLER § 2035, at 265.
33. E.g., Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Technical
Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 F.R.D. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see WRIGHT &
MILLER § 2035, at 265, and § 2043, at 301.
34. United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (emphasis in original).
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onstration of fact,"35 or even "that the party disclosing will indeed be
harmed by disclosure." 36
A series of other factors must be weighed against the harm of dis-
semination to determine whether there is good cause for an antidis-
semination protective order. These countervailing considerations
include the policy that discovery should take place in public, 37 the
hardship that a protective order would impose on the party seeking
discovery,38 and the extent to which the information sought to be pro-
tected is truly confidential. 39 This balancing process has not produced
a general standard of good cause, except for the requirement of a spe-
cific showing of harm. One additional, yet seldom recognized, factor
that a court determining the propriety of a protective order must con-
sider is the first amendment interest of the party requesting the infor-
mation.
II. PROTECTIVE ORDERS AS RESTRAINTS ON EXPRESSION
Protective orders restricting dissemination of discovery informa-
tion are important tools for regulating the discovery process. Such or-
ders protect the interests of the producing party, while providing the
requesting party with access to discoverable information. By prohibit-
ing dissemination or disclosure of the discovery information, however,
protective orders operate as a restraint on the requesting party's free-
dom of expression and thereby implicate first amendment considera-
tions.
Antidissemination protective orders are similar to judicial orders
restraining the press, the public, the parties, or attorneys from dissemi-
35. General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973), cer.
denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974). See also WRIGHT & MILLER § 2035, at 265.
36. Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 409 (N.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Essex
Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
37. See United States v. IBM, 66 F.R.D. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck
Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1973). See generally Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d
260, 265 (9th Cir. 1964).
38. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973), cer.
denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974). Genera/Dynamics does not clearly explain what hardships an order
prohibiting dissemination would cause. If a party has a first amendment right to disseminate
discovery information, an order proscribing dissemination presumably results in hardship by ab-
rogating that right. See text accompanying notes 102-11 infra. The Genera/Dynamics court, how-
ever, did not discuss first amendment considerations.
39. To determine whether information was truly confidential, the court in Reliance Ins. Co.
v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), considered the extent to which the information was
known outside of the business, the extent to which it was known inside the business, the measures
taken to guard the secrecy of the information, and the value of the information to the business and
its competitors. Id. at 203-04.
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nating information obtained in judicial proceedings.40 Judicial orders
restraining extrajudicial comment in contexts other than discovery are
uniformly scrutinized under the first amendment.4' Most of the courts
that have issued protective orders prohibiting or restricting dissemina-
tion of discovery information, however, have not addressed the first
amendment implications of those orders.42 Those cases that have con-
fronted the first amendment problem have employed conflicting theo-
ries and have obtained inconsistent results.
A. The Pre-Halkin Cases: Conflicting Approaches.
One line of cases treats protective orders restricting dissemination
of discovery information as meriting little, if any, first amendment
scrutiny. These cases consider information obtained through discovery
as analytically distinct from information acquired outside of the dis-
covery process. In InternationalProducts Corp. v. Koons,43 the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit considered the validity of a protective
order that both sealed a deposition and prohibited dissemination of
certain information obtained outside of discovery proceedings. The
subject matter of the deposition and the independently acquired infor-
mation both concerned payments by corporate officers to South Ameri-
can government officials. The protective order issued by the district
court prohibited dissemination of any information concerning these
payments, thus encompassing the information acquired independently
as well as the contents of the deposition.44 The district court had deter-
mined that public dissemination of the material would be "extremely
embarrassing" to the deponent and "contrary to the best interests of the
foreign policy of the United States."' 45 The restricted party challenged
the order, claiming deprivation of its first amendment rights.
The Second Circuit divided the order into two components: that
portion pertaining to information obtained by deposition, and that por-
tion involving information independently acquired. Any restriction
upon the right to disseminate the latter was held unconstitutional:
40. See text accompanying notes 112-34 infra.
41. See text accompanying notes 112-33 infra. See also Comment, Restrictions on Communi-
cation By Class Action Parties and Attorneys, 1980 DUKE L.J. 360, 370-84 (orders restricting com-
munications by parties and attorneys in the class action context should be scrutinized under the
first amendment).
42. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974); Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D. 386 (N.D. Ga.
1976); United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec.
Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
43. 325 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963).
44. Id. at 404.
45. Id. at 405.
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What causes concern here is that the order. . . curtailed disclo-
sure of information and writings . . . possessed [before the deposi-
tion was taken]. We fail to see how the use of such documents or
information in arguing motions can justify an order preventing [the
restricted parties] from exercising their First Amendment rights to
disclose such documents and information free of governmental re-
straint.4 6
The court firmly rejected, however, the first amendment claim as ap-
plied against the court-sanctioned discovery information:
The portion of the order which seals the deposition . . . and
limits. . . [the use] of information obtained therefrom was plainly
authorized by F.R. Civ. Pro. 30(b), and we entertain no doubt as to
the constitutionality of a rule allowing a federal court to forbid the
publicizing, in advance of trial, of information obtained by one party
from another by use of the Court's processes. 47
The court viewed a protective order governing use of discovery mate-
rial as an exercise of its "inherent equitable powers [over its own
processes] to prevent abuses, oppression, and injustices," 48 and found
no doubt "as to the propriety of the exercise of discretion here."' 49 In
assessing the constitutionality of the order prohibiting dissemination,
the Koons court thus distinguished discovery information from inde-
pendently acquired information. Although the grounds for the protec-
tive order were identical for each kind of information, prohibiting
dissemination of independently acquired information was held consti-
tutionally impermissible, while prohibiting dissemination of discovery
information was allowed.
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ana-
lyzed this problem in Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp.50 In Rod-
gers, the district court had issued a protective order prohibiting
disclosure by counsel of the contents of a deposition and of a memo-
randum obtained by counsel outside of discovery channels. 5' The
46. Id. at 408.
47. Id. at 407. The protective order provisions presently contained in rule 26(c) were, prior
to 1970, set forth in rule 30(b). In addition, the 1970 revisions changed the language to make
protective orders applicable to all forms of discovery. See Notes of Advisory Committee on 1970
Amendment to Rules, 28 U.S.C. app. 440, 444 (1976).
48. 325 F.2d at 407-408 (quoting Gumbel v. Pitken, 124 U.S. 131, 144 (1888)). In Parker v.
CBS, 320 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1963), the Second Circuit addressed a similar situation. The plaintiff
submitted a memorandum in support of a judgment on the pleadings. At the defendant's request,
the plaintiff was ordered not to disseminate either the memorandum or information contained in
it. The court upheld the order insofar as it applied to the memorandum but indicated that the
portion of the order pertaining to the information contained in the memorandum was repugnant
to the first amendment. Id. at 939.
49. 325 F.2d at 408.
50. 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976).
51. The case arose out of an attempt to settle a Title VII claim against United States Steel.
The deposition of a Justice Department attorney included testimony about the formula used to
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court of appeals vacated the protective order on first amendment
grounds, insofar as it prohibited dissemination of the independently ac-
quired memorandum.5 2 The court concluded, however, that its deci-
sion did not apply to that portion of the order restricting dissemination
of the contents of the deposition. The court assumed that if the order
had been limited to discovery material, it would have been valid:
[W]e need not and do not consider here whether a protective order
which prohibits parties or their counsel from disclosing information
or matters obtained solely as a result of the discovery process is ever
subject to the First Amendment's prohibitions against the establish-
ment of laws that abridge freedom of speech. It may well be, for
instance, that the parties and counsel, by taking advantage of or a
part in the discovery processes, implicitly waive their First Amend-
ment rights freely to disclose or disseminate the information ob-
tained through those processes. 53
This language reaffirms the Koons distinction between restricting dis-
semination of discovery materials on the one hand and independently
acquired information on the other. Moreover, the court raised the pos-
sibility that a party, by participating in the discovery process, waives its
first amendment right to disseminate. Thus, Rodgers goes one step
beyond Koons by questioning whether a first amendment right to dis-
seminate discovery information ever exists.
In contrast to Koons and Rodgers another line of cases treats pro-
tective orders prohibiting dissemination of discovery information as
nearly equivalent to prior restraints on expression, which bear a heavy'
presumption of unconstitutionality.54 In Davis v. Romney55 the plain-
tiffs sought discovery of government documents in an action alleging
substandard conditions in homes insured by the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration. The defendants initially neglected to produce the re-
quested documents. Faced with an order compelling discovery,
however, they sought a protective order either denying discovery or
keeping the information off the public record, to "prevent its being
available to the local press."' 56 In their motion for a protective order,
calculate a back-pay award. Petitioners, however, independently acquired a document containing
essentially the same information. The districtjudge prohibited dissemination ofboth items. Id. at
1005 n.8.
52. Id. at 1009.
53. Id. at 1006 (dictum).
54. Under the first amendment a prior restraint on expression bears a "heavy presumption"
of invalidity. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,419 (1971); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Bantam Books
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
55. 55 F.R.D. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
56. Id. at 339-40.
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the defendants alleged that dissemination would create two potential
harms: first, public dissemination of the information would create an
atmosphere in which persons tried in related criminal proceedings 57
might not receive a fair trial; and second, public disclosure would in-
vade the privacy of certain persons named in the requested documents.
Rejecting both arguments, the district court found the requested protec-
tive order very similar to a prior restraint on expression.5 8 The court
perceived the order as a restraint on the press, and concluded that
neither the potential denial of a fair trial because of adverse publicity
nor the possible invasion of privacy justified the order: "By suggesting
only possible difficulties that could result from allowing the press access
to the information through the public record, the defendants have not
sustained the heavy burden required for a prior restraint. ' 59 The court
failed to consider that the requested order applied only to discovery
information; its analysis of the first amendment problem is thus differ-
ent from the approach in Koons and Rodgers.60 By not addressing the
issue, Davis implicitly rejected the notion that information acquired in
discovery and information independently acquired require separate
treatment under the first amendment.
In Reliance Insurance Co. v. Barron's,61 a 1977 case involving se-
curities and libel claims, 62 the district court applied a similar prior re-
straint analysis. In Reliance the plaintiff expressed a willingness to
produce certain internal corporate documents and records, but re-
quested a protective order prohibiting defendants, a magazine and a
journalist, from disseminating the material to anyone other than the
parties, their attorneys, or expert witnesses. The plaintiffs also desired
to prevent the use of the material "in any publication, address, lecture
or other medium of public dissemination, except as such information is
a matter of public record or is otherwise known to the defendants and
their employees and agents. ' 63 The court first decided that the plain-
tiffs failed to demonstrate the requisite good cause under Federal Rule
26(c) because the motion lacked a sufficient showing of confidentiality
57. Id. at 343. The requested documents were pertinent to grand jury proceedings taking
place concurrently with the civil action. See id. at 340-43.
58. "While this is not. . . the classic case of a prior restraint, it approaches it." Id. at 344
(quoting Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Department of Hous. & Urban Dev., 343 F. Supp. 1176
(E.D. Pa. 1972)).
59. 55 F.R.D. at 345 (emphasis in original).
60. Davis never refers to the Koons case, decided almost nine years earlier.
61. 428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
62. Reliance sued Barron's after the latter published an uncomplimentary article that alleg-
edly impaired the marketability of a proposed stock issue. Id. at 201.
63. Id. at 202.
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and expected harm from dissemination. 64 Had there been no first
amendment problem, the court indicated that it would have inspected
the material in camera and reconsidered the order.65 Instead, the court
denied the motion for the protective order outright as an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint on the press. 66
The Reliance court stated that, under the reasoning in Koons, a
protective order is constitutional if the party seeking protection satisfies
the "heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a
restraint. ' 67 The court reasoned that a protective order, like any other
prior restraint on free expression, carries a heavy burden of justification
under the first amendment. Reliance thereby implicitly rejected the
Rodgers dictum that a party engaged in discovery waives its first
amendment rights .6  Accordingly, the order was denied in Reliance be-
cause the plaintiff had failed to meet its first amendment burden of
showing that "the material to be restrained is, indeed, confidential, and
that its publication would cause plaintiff to suffer serious and irrepara-
ble injury."'69 As in Davis, the Reliance court considered the requested
protective order to be tantamount to an order enjoining publication di-
rectly.70  The Reliance court did not differentiate between orders
prohibiting dissemination of discovery information and similar orders
pertaining to independently acquired information.
Koons, Rodgers, Davis, and Reliance present conflicting and irrec-
oncilable approaches to scrutiny of protective orders under the first
amendment. Moreover, none of the opinions, except for the dictum in
Rodgers, squarely address the extent of the first amendment interest in
disseminating discovery information. Koons sidestepped the issue by
assuming that a protective order is valid as applied to discovery infor-
mation. The court offered no reasons for differentiating between dis-
64. Id. at 204.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 204-05.
67. "[A] prior restraint may be constitutional, under International Products [v. Koons], .
but one seeking such relief bears a 'heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of
such a restraint'." Id. at 204 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419
(1971)). The court misread Koons, however. If the order in Koons had satisfied the heavy burden
required to justify a restraint on expression, then the entire order would have been valid. The
differential treatment of discovery material in Koons strongly indicates that the Koons court be-
lieved a much lesser burden justifies protective orders than the burden required for restraints on
dissemination of independently acquired material. See text accompanying notes 43-49 supra.
68. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
69. 428 F. Supp. at 204 (emphasis in original).
70. The court may, however, have felt compelled to reach this conclusion because the de-
fendants were a magazine and a journalist. Id. at 201. It is unclear whether the Reliance court
would have applied the same analysis if the restricted parties had not been members of the public
media. See 92 HARv. L. REV., supra note 6, at 1553 n.32.
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covery information and independently acquired information. Davis
and Reliance equated protective orders prohibiting parties from dis-
seminating discovery information with direct prior restraints on the
press, without providing a sound explanation for the conclusion. None
of these cases explicitly set forth a usable standard or test for assessing
the validity of protective orders prohibiting dissemination.
B. The Halkin Decision.
The extent of a first amendment right to disseminate discovery in-
formation and the circumstances in which that right may be limited
received an exhaustive analysis in In re Halkin,7t a 1979 decision by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs in
Halkin, a number of individuals and organizations, sued the Central
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and certain other
government agencies, alleging illegal surveillance of the plaintiffs and
other citizens opposed to the war in Vietnam and demanding equitable
relief and damages. Pursuant to a request by the plaintiffs under rule
34,72 the defendants produced documents without seeking a protective
order. Subsequently, the plaintiffs' counsel notified the defendants of
his intention to make the material available for inspection by the press
and the public. The defendants then requested and were granted a pro-
tective order prohibiting the proposed dissemination on the ground
that public disclosure of the material would be "prejudicial to the de-
fendants' right to adjudication of the issues in this civil action in an
uncolored and unbiased climate, including a fair trial." 73 On a petition
71. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) provides in part: "Any party may serve on any other party it re-
quest (1) to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on his behalf to
inspect and copy, any designated documents ....
73. 598 F.2d at 181-82. In support of their position, the defendants cited Local Rule 1-27(d).
That rule prohibits attorneys from making extrajudicial comments concerning ongoing litigation,
other than references to public records, if it is reasonable to assume that the statement will be
publicly disseminated and that the dissemination will interfere with a fair trial. 598 F.2d at 181
n.5. The defendants also noted that Canon 20 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics con-
demns dissemination of information to newspapers by attorneys regarding pending or anticipated
litigation as a potential interference with a fair trial. 598 F.2d at 181 n.5. The District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals retained Canon 20 "in lieu" of Disciplinary Rules 7-107(G) and (H) of the
American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility. 'Id. Cf. Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (holding Discipli-
nary Rule 7-107(G) of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility un-
constitutional under the first amendment). See notes 128-33 infra and accompanying text. The
defendants in Halkin did not, however, submit affidavits or other material in support of the mo-
tion for a protective order. 598 F.2d at 182. The district court's order stated, in part:
[I]t appearing to the Court that extra-judicial statements or disclosure of discovery
materials by the parties, their counsel, and researchers, consultants, or other persons who
may be associated with them in this civil action are contrary to rules applicable to the
[Vol. 1980:766
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for a writ of mandamus to vacate the protective order,74 the court of
appeals held the order invalid as an unconstitutional infringement of
the plaintiffs' first amendment rights.75
Judge Bazelon's majority opinion contains a thorough examina-
tion of the first amendment issues involved in issuing protective orders
restricting dissemination of discovery materials. The court initially de-
cided that a protective order prohibiting dissemination is not a paradig-
matic prior restraint.76 Judge Bazelon noted that "[a] judicial order
pursuant to rule 26(c) limiting lawyers' and parties' expression does
possess many of the characteristics of an administrative licensing
scheme. ' 77 After surveying the dangers of administrative censorship
systems and broad judicial gag orders,78 however, he concluded that a
protective order differs from a typical prior restraint "because the order
can be limited to specific expression rather than imposing a restraint of
unknown breadth on speech."' 79 Thus, the disputed protective order
did not bear the "almost insurmountable presumption" of invalidity
that confronts a prior restraint.80 Nevertheless, the order was suffi-
ciently similar to a prior restraint to require "close scrutiny of its im-
pact on protected First Amendment expression." 8'
conduct of litigation before this Court and inconsistent with the obligations of parties
and their counsel to further the just determination of matters within its jurisdiction, it is
ORDERED that documents and information furnished during the course of discov-
ery in this civil action shall not, unless made a part of the open Court record herein, be
the subject, either directly or indirectly, of extrajudicial statements or publication by the
parties or their counsel, nor shall they otherwise disclose any such information or docu-
ments except in proceedings before this Court ....
Id. at 182 n.8.
74. The remedy of mandamus is traditionally a "drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordi-
nary situations." Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). The Halkin court,
upon finding that the protective order violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, decided that
mandamus was appropriate. 598 F.2d at 197-200. Judge Bazelon's analysis relies heavily on the
importance and timeliness of first amendment rights. It is therefore questionable whether the
district court's protective order could have been appealed on nonconstitutional grounds. See
Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1006 n.12 (3d Cir. 1976) (in determining
whether to vacate an order prohibiting dissemination of certain information, the court noted:
"We are mindful that we should not decide constitutional issues if there is another ground for
decision. . . . We reach the First Amendment issue here because if the court's order were consti-
tutional, we doubt that mandamus would be proper in this case to vacate the order").
75. 598 F.2d at 197. The court technically did not issue a writ of mandamus vacating the
order. Instead, a copy of the decision was transmitted to the district court "to permit further
proceedings in light of the discussion herein." Id. at 200 (footnote omitted).
76. Id. at 183-86.
77. Id. at 183.
78. Id. at 184 n.15.
79. Id. at 185 n.17.
80. Id. at 186. See note 54 supra.
81. 598 F.2d at 186.
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. The Halkin court asserted that orders restraining extrajudicial
comment by attorneys or parties "have been uniformly held a serious
restriction of fundamental First Amendment rights."' 2 Noting that
"[1]itigation itself is a form of expression protected by the First Amend-
ment, '8 3 the court concluded that the parties and attorneys could retain
their freedom of speech.84 Moreover, Judge Bazelon found a general
first amendment right to disseminate information, regardless of how
the information is acquired.85 This right, he reasoned, precludes any
limitation upon first amendment rights merely because the information
is acquired through the discovery process.8 6
Judge Bazelon read Koons narrowly to mean, "[a]t most, .. that
a properly drawn restraining order, supported by a proper showing of
good cause, is compatible with the First Amendment. 8s7 The court re-
jected the argument that judicial control over access to discovery infor-
mation concomitantly empowers a court to condition access and use of
discovery information without regard for the first amendment. The
court expressly rejected the dictum in Rodgers asserting that litigants
waive their first amendment rights by engaging in discovery.88 Con-
ceding that parties have no right of access to discovery information,
Judge Bazelon nevertheless stated that "a court cannot condition the
'privilege' of access on a waiver of First Amendment rights."89
82. Id. at 187. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Chase v.
Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970). See notes 123-33 infra and accompanying text.
83. 598 F.2d at 187. As authority for this proposition, the court cited In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412, 431 (1978) (litigation may be "a vehicle for effective political expression and association, as
well as a means of communicating useful information to the public"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 429 (1963) (litigation is "a form of political expression"); and Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
Bauer, 522 F.2d at 258 ("Civil litigation in general often exposes the need for governmental action
or correction. Such revelations should not be kept from the public").
84. 598 F.2d at 187.
85. Id. at 187-88. Judge Bazelon pointed out that courts have recognized a right to dissemi-
nate even when the information is stolen (see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971)), or taken in violation of a security agreement (see United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d
1309 (4th Cir.), cer. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972)). 598 F.2d at 187-88. See also Rodgers v.
United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1008 n.16 (3d Cir. 1976).
86. "A party's right to disseminate information is far stronger for discovery materials than
for information that has been stolen or obtained in breach of contract." 598 F.2d at 188. See note
85 supra. Moreover, in the absence of bad faith or a protective order, a party may use discovery
information "in any way the law permits." Leonia Amusement Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 18 F.R.D.
503, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); accord, Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308, 312
(E.D. Pa. 1969). The federal rules do not restrict the use of discovery materials unless good cause
is shown why a restriction should be issued. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 188; Fato. R. Civ. P.
26(c).
87. 598 F.2d at 189 (footnote omitted). See note 67 supra.
88. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
89. 598 F.2d at 190. The court embraced the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" to
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The Halkin court sought to protect the first amendment interest in
disseminating discovery material by fashioning a three-part standard,
which it incorporated into the good cause requirement of rule 26(c).
This standard represents the first attempt by any court to set forth a
pragmatic test for assessing the validity of a protective order that pro-
hibits dissemination. The court declared that to justify such a protec-
tive order, "the harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and
serious; the restraining order must be narrowly drawn and precise; and
there must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest
which intrudes less directly on expression." 90 The order issued in
Halkin failed on all three counts. First, the allegation that dissemina-
tion would threaten defendants' chances for a fair trial was too con-
clusory to justify protection. Second, the order was overbroad,
applying to a large amount of material unexamined by the court.
Third, the defendants made no showing that the alleged harm could
not be avoided by the use of less intrusive means.91
Judge Wilkey filed a vigorous dissent. Relying heavily on Koons
and Rodgers, he distinguished between orders restricting dissemination
of independently acquired information and protective orders directed
at discovery materials:
The distinction is this: Although each is a form of "prior restraint,"
the constitutional permissibility of the first order is determined by
application of a vigorous "clear-and-present-danger" type standard,
whereas the constitutional permissibility of the latter order is gov-
erned by the less stringent standards embodied in the discovery
laws.92
This difference, argued Judge Wilkey, arises from the difference in the
methods of acquiring the information:
[L]itigants who wish to disseminate discovery materials have
gained access to such materials-access which they would not ordi-
narily have-through a statutory system that expressly reserves to the
courts the power to attach restrictions on the use of such materials.
Thus, when litigants receive discovery materials, they receive them
already subject to the courts' exercise of this discretionary power.
The First Amendment interest of litigants in the dissemination of this
support its position. See notes 135-51 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the doctrine
in this context.
90. 598 F.2d at 191 (footnotes omitted). The Halkin test is discussed in the text accompany-
ing notes 178-96 infra.
91. 598 F.2d at 196-97.
92. Id. at 204 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey further argued that the cases that invali-
dated judicial orders prohibiting dissemination of independently acquired information-e.g., Ne-
braska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d
242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir.
1975); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970)-were inapposite because the protective
order was addressed only to immediate parties and counsel, was limited in duration, and was




material is, therefore, limited: It is necessarily qualified or condi-
tioned by the potential restrictions that are part of the system through
which the materials have been obtained. 93
Judge Wilkey further noted that applying a rigorous first amendment
test would be illogical: such a test makes it more difficult to restrict the
use of discovery information than to deny discovery altogether. Since
no constitutional right of access to discovery material can be asserted, 94
an order denying discovery does not implicate first amendment inter-
ests. The court need only weigh the asserted harm in disclosure against
the need for disclosure.95 A rigorous constitutional standard for protec-
tive orders that compel production but restrict dissemination, according
to Judge Wilkey, would be a logical anomaly that fails to conform with
"the principle that the greater (the power to prohibit altogether) in-
cludes the lesser (the power to grant with conditions), a bit of logic
which has been recognized as valid at least since the ancient Greeks. ' '96
Therefore, he argued, protective orders restricting dissemination of dis-
covery materials need only satisfy the traditional good cause require-
ment under rule 26(C). 97 This showing of good cause is less stringent
than the first amendment standards delineated by the Halkin majority
and by the courts considering other kinds of judicial orders restraining
expression.98 Jud&e Wilkey concluded that the protective order in
Halkin had been properly granted by the district court. The already
93. 598 F.2d at 206 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey stated that conditioning access to
discovery materials was proper.
My view that a recipient of discovery materials has no more than a conditional interest
in those materials is thus very analogous to the view taken by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in
Arnett v. Kennedy [416 U.S. 134, 155 (1974)] with respect to one's property interest in a
government job. Therein Mr. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the property interest
which appellee had in his [nonprobationary federal] employment was itself conditioned
by the procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant of that interest.
Id. at 207 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). But c. id. at 190 n.28 (Bazelon, J., re-
marking that a majority of the Arnell Court did not accept Justice Rehnquist's argument). The
Halkin court rejected the conditional access theory. See text accompanying note 89 supra. For a
discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in this context, see text accompanying notes
135-51 infra.
94. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
95. See Notes of Advisory Committee, supra note 47, at 444. Cf. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at
195 (majority opinion) (if an order denying discovery is the only alternative to an order prohibit-
ing dissemination, the latter order may be the least intrusive alternative).
96. 598 F.2d at 209 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
97. See text accompanying notes 29-39 supra. In this regard, Judge Wilkey stated that good
cause required a showing of reasonable likelihood that the threatened harm would occur. 598
F.2d at 206 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
98. See note 92 supra. Thus, the predicted harm from dissemination can be "[i]ess crippling"
than the degree of harm required by the majority in Halkin. 598 F.2d at 206 (Wilkey, J., dissent-
ing). Additionally, Judge Wilkey would leave it to the trial judge's discretion whether to issue a
protective order. The court would not be required to make detailed factual findings, but merely to
"provide a record sufficient for meaningful review." Id. (Wilkey, J., dissenting); f Nebraska
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"massive" pretrial publicity surrounding the case, the "selective" re-
lease of the materials proposed by plaintiffs, and the judicial policy
against extrajudicial comments concerning pending litigation were suf-
ficient to justify a finding that protection was warranted to preserve the
chance of a fair trial.99
The Halkin majority and dissenting opinions constitute the most
comprehensive analysis of the extent to which protective orders prohib-
iting dissemination of discovery information are permissible under the
first amendment. But the sharp doctrinal differences represented by the
two positions indicate that the problem remains unsettled. The differ-
ing views of the Halkin majority, the Wilkey dissent, and the pre-
Halkin cases can be reconciled by a reformulation of the rule 26(c)
"good cause" requirement. Such a reformulation can permit a balanc-
ing of the legitimate interests of the party seeking protection and the
party seeking discovery, while preserving the liberal discovery process.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND CONDITIONAL ACCESS:
A FRAMEWORK FOR RECONCILIATION
The decisions urging separate, less stringent treatment of antidis-
semination protective orders under the first amendment are grounded
in the concept of conditional access: because the court has discretion to
deny access to discovery material altogether, it should be able to restrict
the use of the material by the recipient."°0 Although this position has
strong logical appeal,10' a more thorough analysis reveals that it is un-
sound.
A. The First Amendment Right to Disseminate Discovery
Information.
Judge Bazelon's conclusion in Halkin that there exists a first
amendment right to disseminate discovery information' 02 is well rea-
soned. The federal rules embody a policy that, in the absence of judi-
cially imposed restraints, discovery, like other civil pretrial
proceedings, is a public proceeding.'0 3 If not restricted by a protective
order, parties are free to disseminate discovery information.'0 4
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1976) (requiring detailed findings that less intrusive
alternatives are inadequate before issuing an order restraining expression).
99. 598 F.2d at 211-13 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
100. See text accompanying notes 47, 53, & 93 supra.
101. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
102. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
103. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
104. See note 86 supra.
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Moreover, first amendment protection should not be precluded
merely because information has been obtained through discovery. The
courts have consistently recognized a first amendment right to dissemi-
nate information without regard to the means by which the information
was acquired. This proposition is most clearly exemplified in Netv York
Times Co. v. United States,0 5 in which the Supreme Court refused to
enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers. The majority opinions did
not address the fact that the information sought to be published had
been stolen from the government. 0 6 Despite the illicit means of acqui-
sition, the Court held that the first amendment right to publish the in-
formation outweighed any alleged harm to the national security that
would result from publication. 107 Similarly, in United States v.
Marchetti °8 the court recognized a first amendment right to dissemi-
nate information even though the dissemination violated a security
agreement. 0 9 It seems reasonably clear, then, that the existence of a
first amendment right to disseminate information does not depend on
how the information was acquired.1 0 It is logical, therefore, to extend
105. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
106. The Court primarily addressed whether the harm posed to national security interests was
sufficient to justify enjoining publication of the Pentagon Papers. Chief Justice Burger's dissent
was quick to point out, however, that the papers were "purloined." 403 U.S. at 749 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Moreover, Justice Harlan complained that the haste with which the courts dealt with
the case resulted in a failure to address the question "[w]hether the newspapers are entitled to
retain and use the documents notwithstanding the seemingly uncontested facts that the documents
. . were purloined from the Government's possession and that the newspapers received them
with knowledge that they had been feloniously acquired." Id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
also Comment, Discovery andthe First Amendment, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 331, 337-38 (1979).
107. 403 U.S. at 714.
108. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
109. Marchetti, upon resigning from the Central Intelligence Agency, signed a secrecy oath,
promising not to disseminate "any information relating to the national defense and security" with-
out prior consent from the agency. 466 F.2d at 1312 n.2. The court refused to enforce this agree-
ment "to the extent that it purports to prevent disclosure of unclassified information, for, to that
extent, the oath would be in contravention of his First Amendment rights." Id. at 1317. The court
also concluded that Marchetti apparently had been given no consideration for the oath, "so that it
would be, generally, unenforceable on that ground" as well. Id. at 1317 n.6. It is not clear on
which ground the decision rests. The language concerning the first amendment, however, is per-
suasive authority for the proposition that a contractual agreement not to disseminate unclassified
information is unenforceable. See also Snepp v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 763 (1980). In Snepp,
the petitioner failed to submit a manuscript to the CIA for prepublication clearance, pursuant to
an express agreement between the petitioner and the CIA. The Court, per curiam, held that the
agreement created a fiduciary relationship between the parties. Snepp's breach of that relation-
ship justified the imposition of a constructive trust in favor of the CIA upon the profits from
publication of the manuscript. Notably, the United States did not ask the Court to restrain publi-
cation, nor did the Court consider such a remedy.
110. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2830 (1980) ("[This] Court
has accorded virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas") (Stevens,
J., concurring); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court in Rodgers v. United
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to the dissemination of discovery information a degree of first amend-
ment protection at least equivalent to that accorded stolen information
or information disseminated in breach of contract.II
B. First Amendment Limitations on Restraining Extrajudicial
Comment.
A protective order prohibiting a party from disseminating discov-
ery information operates as an infringement of that party's freedom of
expression. Such a protective order should accordingly be examined in
light of the court's treatment of orders restricting extrajudicial expres-
sion in analogous contexts. Only in rare cases has an order restraining
extrajudicial comment by the press, the public, the parties, or the attor-
neys been upheld against a first amendment challenge.
The justification for an order restraining extrajudicial expression
probably is strongest in the criminal context, where the defendant has
an explicit sixth amendment right to a fair trial."l2 In Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart,"3 however, the Supreme Court held invalid an
order restraining extrajudicial comments on a pending criminal case.
The defendant was charged with a brutal multiple slaying, and had
been the subject of much prejudicial pretrial publicity." 4 The Ne-
braska Supreme Court issued an order prohibiting the press from pub-
lishing or broadcasting facts concerning any confessions made by the
defendant or other facts "strongly implicative" of the defendant." 5
Conceding that pretrial publicity might impair the-defendant's right to
a fair trial," 16 the Supreme Court nevertheless invalidated the gag order
and decided that all less intrusive alternatives must be exhausted before
a court may impose a broad prior restraint.' 7 The Court suggested
States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976), also recognized a first amendment interest in
dissemination of stolen materials. The Rodgers court, in refusing to issue a protective order
prohibiting dissemination of information acquired outside of the discovery process, noted that
"[e]ven if, as respondents contend, [the information] were stolen, and we express no view on this,
...that fact would not dictate a different result." 536 F.2d at 1008 n.16. See generally Comment,
supra note 106, at 337-40.
111. See note 86 supra; Comment, supra note 106, at 336-40.
112. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
113. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
114. Id. at 542.
115. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 801, 236 N.W.2d 794, 803 (1975).
116. 427 U.S. at 562-63.
117. Id. at 563-65. See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980)




change of venue, postponement of trial, voir dire, jury instructions, and
sequestration of jurors as potential alternatives. "8
While the Nebraska Press Court did not explicitly discuss re-
straints on the extrajudicial comments of lawyers, parties, or wit-
nesses," 9 the decision implies that gag orders are appropriate only
where lesser alternatives will not suffice to protect a defendant's consti-
tutional right to a fair trial.' 20 Even when orders that restrain extraju-
dicial statements are permissible, they must be drawn as narrowly as
possible under the circumstances to minimize the intrusion of the re-
strained party's first amendment interests. To withstand first amend-
ment scrutiny, the trial judge must make a clear, specific finding that
the order is necessary to prevent a substantial threat to the administra-
tion of justice.' 2'
118. Id. at 563-64.
119. The Court's analysis centered upon the impact of the restraint on the press. The Court
noted that in the earlier case of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), it had outlined "other
measures short of prior restraints on publication tending to blunt the impact of pretrial publicity."
427 U.S. at 564. In Sheppard the Court suggested that the trial judge "might well have proscribed
extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial
matters." 384 U.S. at 361. Justice Brennan's concurrence in Nebraska Press is instructive as well:
"It is very doubtful that the court would not have the power to control release of information by
[court personnel and attorneys] in appropriate cases." 427 U.S. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
Recently, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980), the Court held
that the press and the public have a first amendment right to attend criminal trials. In a plurality
opinion, however, Chief Justice Burger carefully noted that the Court decided only:
whether a criminal trial. . . may be closed to the public upon the unopposed request of
a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defend-
ant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other overriding consideration requires
closure.
Id. at 2821 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). See also id. at 2829-30 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). The Rich.
mondNewspapers Court, therefore, while conferring a constitutional right of access to courtroom
proceedings recognized that in certain cases this right may be outweighed by the defendant's right
to a fair trial.
120. The power to restrain extrajudicial comment by attorneys, parties, or witnesses alluded to
in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 361 (1966) (see note 119 supra), was undoubtedly offered in
that case as a potential remedy for what had been a particularly massive prejudicial publicity
campaign. See 384 U.S. at 338-49. Moreover, the Nebraska Press majority did not specifically
refer to such restraints on extrajudicial expression as potential tools for protecting defendants, but
only obliquely referred to Sheppard. See 427 U.S. at 564 & n.8. Justice Brennan's concurrence in
Nebraska Press would limit the availability of restraints on extrajudicial expression to "appropri-
ate cases," which apparently are cases involving serious problems of prejudicial publicity. See 1d.
at 601 & n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring). See note 119 supra. Thus, a court should exhaust all
alternatives short of restraint on expression before it restrains the extrajudicial expression of trial
participants. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980) (absent suffi-
ciently compelling circumstances, the press and public have a first amendment right to attend
criminal trials).
121. See Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. at 562-63 ("Our review of the pretrial record persuades us that the trial judge was justi-
fied in concluding that there would be intense and pervasive pretrial publicity concerning this
case." Hence, the discussion of alternatives for minimizing the prejudicial effects of pretrial pub-
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Cases addressing the free-speech, fair-trial issue in the civil context
closely track the criminal cases. 122 In CBS, Inc. v. Young, 123 a civil
case arising out of the Kent State shootings in 1970, the trial court had
issued a broad order restraining "all counsel and Court personnel, all
parties concerned with this litigation, whether plaintiffs or defendants,
their relatives, close friends, and associates [from] discussing in any
manner whatsoever these cases with members of the news media or the
public." 124 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, relying heavily
on an analogous criminal case,' 25 held the order invalid; there was no
substantial evidence of "serious and imminent threats"'126 to the fair-
ness of the trial, and the order was overbroad since it applied to close
friends, relatives, and associates, and prohibited discussion "in any
matter whatsoever."'127
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 28 the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit invalidated Disciplinary Rule 7-107(G) of the
American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, which
prohibited attorneys from making extrajudicial comments relating to
evidence, witnesses, parties, the merits of a case, or any other matters
reasonably likely to interfere with the fair trial of civil actions.' 29 The
court noted that the right to a fair trial in a civil case simply does not
licity, see text accompanying note 118 supra, was based on a substantial threat of sixth amendment
deprivation).
The courts are split as to how much likelihood of harm must be demonstrated before an order
restraining extrajudicial comment is justified. One series of decisions requires a "reasonable like-
lihood" of a serious threat to a fair trial. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 370 (4th Cir.
1979); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661, 666 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969);
Society of Professional Journalists v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.S.C.), aj'd with qua/ifea-
ions, 556 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). Another series employs a
stricter standard-a "serious and imminent threat" to a fair trial. See, e.g., Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 249 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); In re Oliver,
452 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d at 1061.
122. See generally Note, Gag Order Protection for Civil Trials, 64 GEo. L.J. 967 (1976).
123. 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
124. Id. at 236.
125. Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970). Chase involved a criminal action for
destruction of selective service files. The trial court ordered that all counsel and defendants re-
frain from making extrajudicial comments concerning the case. The court of appeals issued a writ
of mandamus vacating the order because the trial court had failed to determine that the pro-
scribed comments constituted a "serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice."
Id. at 1061.
126. 522 F.2d at 240.
127. Id. at 239-40.
128. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
129. The rule provides:
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its investi-
gation or litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement, other than
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enjoy the constitutional status of the sixth amendment right in a crimi-
nal case:
[A]lithough we rightfully place a prime value on providing a sys-
tem of impartial justice to settle civil disputes, we require even a
greater insularity against the possibility of interference with fairness
in criminal cases .... [M]ere invocation of the phrase "fair trial"
does not as readily justify a restriction on speech when we are refer-
ring to civil trials.130
Moreover, the court explained that, given the normal lengthiness
of civil litigation and the legitimate use of civil suits to expose the need
for government action or change, restrictions on extrajudicial comment
in civil matters are especially suspect. t3 t Accordingly, the court held
that the areas of proscribed extrajudicial comment relating to civil mat-
ters embodied in Disciplinary Rule 7-107(G)132 were "constitutionally
impermissible if deemed presumptively prohibited."' 33
Judicial restraints on extrajudicial comment are thus permissible
only in very narrow circumstances, even when the countervailing inter-
est is the right to a fair trial. To survive constitutional scrutiny, an
order must be drawn as narrowly as possible to minimize its intrusion
on free speech. Restraints on the press and public are particularly dis-
favored in civil cases, where the fair trial right is not of constitutional
proportions.
Protective orders prohibiting dissemination of discovery materials
are subject to similar scrutiny, as the Halkin decision demonstrates.t 34
a quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would expect to
be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or prospective
witness.
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure
of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except as re-
quired by law or administrative rule.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-107(G) (1975).
130. 522 F.2d at 257-58. See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814,
2829 n.17 (1980) ("Whether the public has a [first amendment] right to attend trials of civil cases is
a question not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have
been presumptively open.") (opinion of Burger, C.J.).
131. 522 F.2d at 258.
132. See note 129 supra.
133. 522 F.2d at 258. The court noted, however, that "[i]f some restriction is necessary in a
particular case then perhaps a specific order can be entered supported by a record showing its
necessity and the unavailability of a narrower restriction." Id. at 259.
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar result in the recent case of Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d
356 (4th Cir. 1979), in which the court invalidated DR 7-107(G) as overbroad and vague. "The
dearth of evidence that lawyers' comments taint civil trials and the courts' ability to protect confi-
dential information establish that the rule's restrictions on freedom of speech are not essential to
fair civil trials. We therefore conclude that this provision of the rule is invalid." 594 F.2d at 373.
134. See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
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Although the considerations militating in favor of a protective order
will usually not involve fair trial interests, but instead will focus upon
the protection of confidentiality and the facilitation of the discovery
process, the impact of such an order is the same as any order re-
straining parties from making extrajudicial statements: freedom of ex-
pression is circumscribed. Unless discovery merits some special
analysis under the first amendment, protective orders prohibiting dis-
semination of discovery information should be examined with the same
first amendment scrutiny as other orders restricting extrajudicial com-
ment.
C. Discovery, Protective Orders, and Unconstitutional Conditions.
Access to discovery information is both created and regulated by
the courts.1 35 Judge Wilkey's dissent in Halkin,x36 the dictum in Rod-
gers,137 and the implications of Koons138 all suggest that the power to
grant or deny access to discovery information necessarily includes the
power to impose conditions on access; therefore, protective orders
prohibiting dissemination do not merit strict first amendment scru-
tiny. t 3 9
As the Halkin court indicated, however, even though the discovery
process is governed by the courts, a court may not condition access to
discovery information on a waiver of constitutional rights. It is well
settled that the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a
basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests--especially,
his interest in freedom of speech."' 40 Permitting the government to
135. See text accompanying notes 11-17 supra.
136. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
137. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
139. Mr. Justice Holmes, sitting on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, advanced a
similar argument in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517
(1892). The court in McA4uliffe denied relief to a policeman who had been fired for violating a
regulation that limited his right to engage in political activity. Justice Holmes' oft-quoted re-
sponse to the policeman's claim was that "[tihe petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." .d. Justice Holmes went on to
explain:
There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his
constitutional right of free speech, as well as of idleness, by the implied terms of his
contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which
are offered him.
Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18. This view has been vigorously disputed. See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-8 (1978); Van Alstyne, The Demise ofthe Righ-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
140. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); accord, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See generaly L. TRIBE,
mspra note 139, § 10-8; Van Alstyne, supra note 139.
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condition availability of a benefit upon the recipient's agreement to re-
linquish his constitutional rights "would allow the government to 'pro-
duce a result which [it] could not command directly'. 1 41
Literally applied, this doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions"
seems to disallow any restrictions on constitutional rights that would be
invalid if applied to persons not receiving government benefits.142 Ap-
plying the doctrine in the discovery context, antidissemination protec-
tive orders might be permissible only if the same order would be valid
as applied to independently acquired information.1 43 The doctrine has
not been applied in this manner, however. Instead, governmental in-
terests prompting the attachment of a condition to a governmental ben-
efit may make the condition permissible in certain circumstances. 44
The Supreme Court adopted this position in Pickering v. Board of Edu-
cation,t45 a case involving the dismissal of a teacher for criticizing
school board policies.146 Although the Court acknowledged that it is
impermissible to compel teachers to relinquish their first amendment
rights as a condition of employment, 47 it concluded that "the State has
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation
141. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
526 (1958)). "As a consequence, it seems to follow that the first amendment forbids the govern-
ment to condition its largess upon the willingness of [a party] to surrender a right which he would
otherwise be entitled to exercise .... " Van Alstyne, supra note 139, at 1446. See also Frost &
Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926) ("If the state may compel
the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel
a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United
States may thus be manipulated out of existence").
142. See Van Alstyne, supra note 139, at 1448.
143. This is arguably the position taken by the majority in Halkin. Judge Bazelon categori-
cally refused to treat discovery information differently from other information under the first
amendment. See notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
144. See Van Alstyne, supra note 139, at 1448 ("the connection with the government may in
certain circumstances make otherwise unreasonable conditions quite reasonable").
145. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
146. The appellant was dismissed after writing and publishing in a newspaper a letter criticiz-
ing the board of education and the superintendent of schools for the manner in which funds were
allocated between educational and athletic programs. The board conducted a hearing and found
the statements to be false and unjustifiably disparaging. The appellant was dismissed because the
letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district."
id. at 564.
147. The Court stated:
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court's opinion may be read to suggest that
teachers may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights
they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in con-
nection with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it proceeds on a




of the speech of the citizenry in general."'' 48 These countervailing gov-
ernmental interests prompted the Court to fashion an ad hoc balancing
test, weighing the teacher's free speech right to criticize the school
board against the state's interest "in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."' 49 Using this bal-
ancing test, the Court found that dismissing the teacher was improper
because "the interest of the school administration in limiting teachers'
opportunities to contribute to public debate [was] not significantly
greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any mem-
ber of the general public,"°50 and that interest was therefore insufficient
to outweigh the teacher's first amendment interests. Thus, when the
government provides a benefit to certainindividuals, the constitutional-
ity of any condition on access to that benefit-including a condition
limiting the individual's constitutional rights-is determined by a bal-
ancing process in which the government's interests in imposing the con-
dition are considered.' 5'
Viewed in this light, protective orders prohibiting dissemination of
discovery information, as a condition that limits the right of free
speech, should be evaluated under a Pickering-type balancing test.
Protective orders therefore deserve different first amendment treatment
from orders restricting dissemination of independently acquired infor-
mation. Individuals who acquire information outside the discovery
process have not received a government benefit that can be condi-
tioned. Parties using the discovery process, on the other hand, should
be subject to a test that weighs the restrained party's first amendment
rights against the countervailing judicial interests of protecting litigants
148. Id.
149. Id. The Court's balancing test weighed a variety of factors. Those factors supporting a
limitation of the first amendment right to free speech were the state's interest in removing incom-
petent employees, maintaining discipline, preserving morale, maintaining optimal working rela-
tionships, avoiding impairment of governmental operations, and rebutting false statements made
by employees. The factors favoring the teacher's right to criticize were the individual's and the
public's interest in free speech and the degree to which the speech concerned a matter of public
interest. See id. at 569-74; Note, The Nonpartisan Freedom of Expression of Public Employees, 76
MICH. L. REv. 365, 368-69 (1977).
150. 391 U.S. at 573. The Court reasoned that the school cannot compel relinquishment of a
teacher's first amendment rights any more than it can restrict the first amendment rights of other
citizens, unless the school's legitimate countervailing interests in regulating its employees are suffi-
cient. Since firing the teacher did not serve any legitimate countervailing interest, it had to be
judged against the school's interest in regulating the expression of other citizens. There were no
such interests; therefore, the dismissal was improper.
151. Id. at 568, 572-73. The balancing approach fashioned in Pickering was reaffirmed re-
cently in Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v: Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 (1977), in which
the Court declared, "[T]he question of whether speech of a government employee is constitution-
ally protected expression necessarily entails striking a 'balance'" between the teacher's free speech
interest and the state's interest as an employer. See generally Note, supra note 149, at 375-402.
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and the discovery process by regulating dissemination of discovery in-
formation. When the balance tips in favor of protection, a protective
order prohibiting dissemination should be issued.
IV. GOOD CAUSE: A WORKABLE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
A. Interests in Prohibiting Dissemination of Discovery Information.
A litigant may assert several legitimate interests in support of a
protective order restricting dissemination of discovery information, in-
cluding the right to a fair trial, 5 2 protection of confidential informa-
tion, 53 and avoiding personal embarrassment. 54 In addition, the
judicial system has interests of its own to protect. First, it has a strong
interest in maximizing the effectiveness and efficiency of the discovery
process.' 55 Liberal discovery has numerous important purposes,
among them "to avoid surprise and the possible miscarriage of justice,
to disclose fully the nature and scope of the controversy, to narrow,
simplify, and frame the issues involved, and to enable a party to obtain
the information needed to prepare for trial."' 5 6 To insure that parties
further these purposes by producing discoverable materials, it may be
necessary for a court to issue an order restraining the dissemination of
discovery materials. 5 7 Protective orders that restrict dissemination are
a valuable discovery tool because they permit discovery while minimiz-
ing the adverse effect on the producing party. If such orders were un-
available, parties would be less willing to produce sensitive material,
and judges would be more likely to issue protective orders denying dis-
covery of sensitive material. This result would hinder the discovery
process unnecessarily. 58
152. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 181-82.
153. Rule 26(c)(7) expressly allows protection of "trade secrets or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). Protective orders prohibiting
dissemination are regularly issued in this context. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg.
Co., 481 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973), cer. denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974); Chesa Int'l, Ltd. v. Fashion
Assoc., 425 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 573 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1977); Vollert v. Summa Corp.,
389 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975); Xerox Corp. v. IBM, 64 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Essex
Wire Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
154. See, e.g., Nichols v. Philadelphia Tribune Co., 22 F.R.D. 89 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
155. The discovery process embodies the sound judicial policy that "prior to trial every party
to a civil action is entitled to the disclosure of all relevant information in the possession of any
person, unless the information is privileged." WRIGHT & MILLER § 2001, at 15.
156. Id. 17-18.
157. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
158. Id. Judge Bazelon explained that denying discovery altogether, rather than permitting
discovery but restricting dissemination, "benefits no one, for in neither event will the public learn
the contents of the discovery material, and when discovery is denied, the litigant will be deprived
of information relevant to the preparation of the case." Id. at 195.
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Second, the courts have a substantial interest in minimizing the
injuries suffered by parties as a result of participation in the discovery
process. The courts have recognized, for example, that the first amend-
ment does not preclude judicial remedies that prevent or redress inju-
ries caused by dissemination of trade secrets,' 5 9 copyrighted
material,1 60 or other information in which a party has a specific propri-
etary interest. 161 Similarly, when a party seeks to protect information
that is truly confidential, the first amendment should not completely
preclude restrictions on dissemination. 162 Furthermore, discovery is
unique in that it grants one party access to information held, often in
confidence, by another party. An order compelling discovery, but not
restricting dissemination, may operate to compel the producing party to
make public information he seeks to keep private. Freedom of speech
embodies "both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all."'163 In the absence of sufficient justification, a court's
denial of a motion for a protective order may itself be an unconstitu-
tional infringement of the producing party's first amendment rights. 64
The courts should therefore give careful consideration to the producing
party's request for protection from undesirable dissemination. In par-
ticular, the right to disseminate discovery material increases the danger
that the discovery process will be abused by parties to oppress their
opponents unfairly. 65 The courts should have the means to prevent
159. See, e.g., Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 362 n.24 (1979), and cases
cited therein. See also Notes of 4dvisory Committee, supra note 47, at 444.
160. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1169-72 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant's argument that the first amendment operates to limit copyright
protection was rejected by the court). The impact of the first amendment on copyright law, how-
ever, remains unclear. For enlightening discussions of this problem, see Denicola, Copyright and
Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 283
(1979); Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180 (1970).
161. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (petitioner
was not barred by the first amendment from recovering damages for alleged infringement of
"right of publicity" regarding petitioner's human cannonball circus act). See generally L. TRIBE,
supra note 139, §§ 12-14.
162. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) ("If there are privacy
interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid
public documentation or other exposure of private information. Their political institutions must
weigh the interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know and of the press to publish")
(footnote omitted) (dictum).
163. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1979).
164. See id. at 716-17; cf Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974)
("Compelling editors or publishers to publish that which "'reason" tells them should not be pub-
lished" was held unconstitutional under the first amendment).
165. Professor Wright notes that:
Liberal discovery procedures are an important advance in the litigation process but
it cannot be thought that they are an unmixed blessing. Any device, however salutory,
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such abuse. Protective orders that restrict dissemination serve this pur-
pose well, without simultaneously interfering with the discovery proc-
ess.166
To protect these interests, a court can fashion protective orders
with great precision to minimize the restriction on expression. A mo-
tion to prevent the dissemination of specific discovery material requires
no speculation 67 as to the nature or extent of the restraint on expres-
sion. The court may examine the material in camera to determine spe-
cifically whether protection is necessary at all; if protection is necessary,
the court can determine what information should be protected and
what the nature of the protection should be.'68 Accordingly, the mech-
anism for obtaining protective orders eliminates or at least minimizes
many of the variables typically inherent in restraints on expression. A
properly drawn protective order prohibiting dissemination of discovery
material would not be overbroad in its restraint on first amendment
rights.
In short, the judicial system has substantial interests in the contin-
uing availability of antidissemination protective orders. These interests
are unique to the discovery process; they are not present in other con-
texts where restrictions on extrajudicial comment are scrutinized under
the first amendment. 69 In assessing the validity of protective orders
that restrict dissemination, these unique countervailing interests require
that protective orders, unlike other judicial orders restraining extrajudi-
cial expression, be subject to the balancing test proposed in Pickering v.
Board of Education.170
The foregoing analysis refutes both approaches taken in the case
law concerning protective orders and the first amendment. On the one
hand, parties plainly cannot be compelled to waive their first amend-
ment rights in order to participate in discovery, as Rodgers sug-
gested. 171 That analysis runs afoul of the unconstitutional conditions
can be abused and there are undoubtedly instances in which a party will seek to use
discovery in a way that will oppress his opponent ...
C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 83, at 412 (3d ed. 1976).
166. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
167. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1979); ef. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976) (the impact on a trial of potential pretrial publicity is necessarily speculative);
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976) (per se restrictions on extrajudicial comment are unconstitutional: "these rules establish
a blanket prohibition whereby even a trivial, totally innocuous statement could be a violation.
The First Amendment does not allow this broad a sweep").
168. See, e.g., Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 404-06 (1976). See also
WRIGHT & MILLER § 2035, at 266 n.24.
169. See text accompanying notes 112-34 supra.
170. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See notes 145-51 supra and accompanying text.
171. See text accompanying note 53 supra.
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doctrine. Judges do not have complete discretion to attach conditions
on access to discovery information, as Judge Wilkey urged in his
Halkin dissent. 72 That a judge may deny discovery altogether is irrel-
evant. The government may likewise, in its discretion, deny employ-
ment. But the power to deny, in either context, does not include the
power to attach unconstitutional conditions. 173 A court therefore may
not exercise its discretionary power to prohibit dissemination without
considering the first amendment implications of that action.174
On the other hand, Reliance and Halkin err in failing to differenti-
ate between discovery materials and independently acquired informa-
tion. 75 Neither decision recognizes that the interests of the judicial
system in a properly functioning discovery process may differ substan-
tially from its interests in regulating extrajudicial comment gener-
ally.' 76 These decisions are caught in what one commentator has
termed the basic flaw in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine: "the
assumption that the same evil results from attaching certain conditions
to government-connected activity as from imposing such conditions on
persons not connected with government."' 77
Between these two approaches lies the correct position: the bal-
ancing approach of Pickering. The courts should recognize that the
power to restrict dissemination of discovery material is indeed limited
by first amendment considerations but that the countervailing interests
in a properly functioning discovery process mandate a weighing of the
competing concerns. Given the range of competing interests, it is not
possible to fashion a precise standard for assessing the validity of pro-
tective orders restricting dissemination of discovery materials. The
courts should balance the interests of the individual seeking protection
and the interests of the judicial system against the first amendment
rights of the parties to be restrained. As a consequence, the showing
required to justify issuing a protective order will necessarily depend
upon the particular circumstances of each case.
172. See text accompanying notes 93-96 supra.
173. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977).
174. Consequently, Judge Wilkey's logical admonition that the greater power of denial in-
cludes the lesser power to grant pursuant to conditions, see text accompanying note 96 supra, is
incorrect. Though it may have intrinsic logical force, it carries little weight in constitutional anal-
ysis, where the impact of the condition, not the source of the power to apply it, is the critical
factor.
175. Reliance failed to address the difference between discovery information and indepen-
dently acquired information. Halkin expressly rejected the distinction: "We cannot agree with
this bifurcated approach to the First Amendment's protection for speech." 598 F.2d at 186.
176. The judicial system's interests in a properly functioning discovery process are discussed at
text accompanying notes 155-66 supra.
177. Van Alstyne, supra note 139, at 1448.
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B. Incorporating the First Amendment into Good Cause.
In re Halkint78 was the first case to set forth a constitutional stan-
dard for protective orders that restrict dissemination of discovery
materials. The Halkin standard mandates that a protective order be
issued only if the harm posed by dissemination is substantial and seri-
ous, the order is drawn narrowly and precisely, and there is no less
intrusive means of affording protection. t79 The Halkin dissent inter-
preted this standard as virtually reading out "any kind of a showing
under Rule 26(c) as adequate support for a trial court's protective or-
der."180 A more liberal construction of the Hal/kin standard is possible,
however, and is fully consistent with the constitutional considerations
outlined above.' 8 ' Such a construction fits nicely within the good cause
requirement of rule 26(c), albeit incorporating a new first amendment
component into the good cause standard.
The first part of Ha/kin's three-part test requires that the harm
posed by dissemination be "substantial and serious."' 8 2 The court was
unwilling to be more specific:
We decide today than an order restricting dissemination must be
based on full assessment of the interests at stake, with the party seek-
ing the restraining order bearing the burden of making a concrete
and specific showing of the likelihood of harm. . . .We are reluc-
tant at this time to fashion a hard and fast standard governing the
requisite likelihood of harm which would justify all restrictive orders
under Rule 26(c). Dissemination of different categories of discovery
documents, in conjunction with different types of litigation, may well
pose greater or lesser risks to the discovery process, and thus may
require different treatment under Rule 26(c). 183
Carefully weighing the factors militating for and against dissemination
will not render protective orders unavailable. Rather, this considera-
tion will cause judges to recognize that protective orders do, in fact,
intrude on a party's broad first amendment interests, and that this in-
trusion should occur only when it is necessary. 8 4 Read in this manner,
178. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
179. Id. at 191-96.
180. Id. at 211 (Wilkey, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
181. See text accompanying notes 135-51 & 155-68 supra.
182. 598 F.2d at 191.
183. Id. at 193 n.42.
184. In assessing the harm posed by dissemination, the court should, according to Halkin, take
into account the variety of interests asserted in support of protective orders (such as national
security, privilege, or trade secrets) and the need for a flexible tool to protect parties in discovery
from abuse. When the asserted interest in support of a protective order is a fair trial, for example,
two factors the court should consider are whether the trial is civil or criminal, see text accompany-
ing note 130 supra, and whether the case is tried to the bench or to a jury (because presumably a
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the first Halkin factor is fully consistent with existing strict formula-
tions of the good cause requirement of rule 26(c) mandating a showing
of a "clearly defined and very serious injury."'185 The showing required
under Halkin, however, expressly adds to "good cause" a requirement
that the harm in dissemination be weighed against legitimate first
amendment interests in dissemination. Merely alleging a "particular
and specific demonstration of fact"'186 or merely showing that the mov-
ing party "will indeed be harmed by disclosure"'' 87 no longer justifies
an order prohibiting dissemination. Thus, even though the required
showing remains somewhat uncertain, the Halkin standard firms up the
good cause standard by forcing the courts to recognize and consider the
constitutional interests of the nonmoving party, instead of concentrat-
ing only on the interests of the party seeking protection. 88
The second part of the Halkin standard, requiring that the protec-
tive order be narrowly drawn and precise, admonishes the courts to
avoid overbreadth in restricting expression in any particular case. As
Judge Bazelon noted in Halkin, courts easily can avoid issuing unnec-
essarily broad protective orders.189 Courts may examine information in
camera to determine both the need for and the scope of protection. 90
The constitutional requirement of narrow and precise orders is easily
incorporated into good cause. Good cause should require more than a
showing that protection is necessary; it should likewise require that the
courts grant only necessary protection. As with the first Halkin factor,
this requirement is a reasonable limitation on the discretion of the trial
judge, making it necessary for the judge to consider carefully the scope
of permissible protection in any given case. Again, the Halkin stan-
dard operates to define "good cause" more precisely, placing constitu-
jury may be more easily swayed by adverse publicity). 598 F.2d at 192-93. In any event, the party
requesting a protective order must present "a specific showing that dissemination of the discovery
materials would pose a concrete threat to an important countervailing interest." Id. at 193 (foot-
note omitted). The Halkin court, however, did not decide how strong the threat of harm must be
to justify issuance of a protective order. Id. at 193 n.42.
185. United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (emphasis in original). See text
accompanying notes 32-36 supra.
186. General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1162 (1974). See text accompanying note 35 supra.
187. Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 409 (N.D.N.Y. 1973). See text accom-
panying note 36 supra.
188. Cf. General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1162 (1974) (courts should consider the general hardship on the nonmoving party in
determining whether good cause exists).
189. 598 F.2d at 194.
190. Id. Moreover, parties may, in appropriate circumstances, participate in these in camera




tionally compelled outer limits on the discretion of the courts but at the
same time permitting the courts to be flexible and imaginative in ad-
ministering the discovery process.
The third part of the Halkin standard requires that protective or-
ders restricting dissemination of discovery information be granted only
in the absence of less intrusive alternatives. The availability of less in-
trusive alternatives will vary depending on the information sought to
be protected and the reason for the protection. For instance, if, as in
Halkin, the party seeking protection asserts that dissemination will in-
terfere with the conduct of a fair trial, several alternative ways of insur-
ing fairness-such as change of venue, postponement of trial, and
sequestration of jurors--do not infringe on first amendment inter-
ests.19' If a moving party alleges that dissemination of confidential in-
formation will result in injury to business interests 192 or personal
reputation, 93 however, "[t]he only plausible alternative to a protective
order may be the denial of discovery altogether." 194 Although an order
denying discovery avoids first amendment infringements and protects
the confidentiality of the information, it also deprives a litigant of rele-
vant and useful information that is otherwise discoverable. 195 In such a
situation, an antidissemination protective order is preferable over an
order denying discovery.
A requirement that the court consider less intrusive alternatives
before issuing a protective order that infringes on first amendment
rights is perfectly compatible with rule 26(c)'s good cause standard, as
are the other two parts of the Halkin test. Such a requirement merely
makes the court consider all potential means of protecting litigants and
choose the one that is least injurious to the affected parties. Incorporat-
ing the Halkin test into the good cause requirement of rule 26(c) trans-
forms the good cause determination into a balancing test that mandates
close consideration of the facts and competing first amendment inter-
ests. The Halkin test does not unreasonably restrict either the availa-
bility of protective orders or the discretion of the courts in regulating
discovery. The courts retain wide latitude in weighing one party's in-
191. Id. at 195. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976).
192. See, e.g., Essex Wire Corp v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1969)
(antidissemination order issued to protect confidential business information).
193. See, e.g., Nichols v. Philadelphia Tribune Co., 22 F.R.D. 89 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (antidis-
semination order issued to protect personal reputation).
194. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d at 195.
195. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. Depriving the litigant of useful, discoverable
information to protect the producing party is unnecessary and illogical. See text accompanying
note 158 supra. An order denying discovery altogether, therefore, has a more serious detrimental
impact on the nonmoving party than an order permitting discovery but prohibiting dissemination.
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terests in requesting protection against the other party's first amend-
ment interests in dissemination. 96
In summary, a sensible construction of the Ha/kin test allows for a
Pickering-type balancing approach that protects constitutional free-
speech interests adequately without making it impossible to obtain pro-
tective orders prohibiting dissemination. The Halkin test can be incor-
porated into the good cause requirement of rule 26(c). In the past, the
courts have been unable to develop a workable standard of good cause
for issuing protective orders prohibiting dissemination. 197 In addition,
the courts have not always considered the first amendment implications
of antidissemination protective orders. The Halkin test is an excellent
formulation of the good cause standard that properly accounts for the
constitutional right to disseminate discovery information. The test pro-
vides useful guidelines for assessing the interests of all relevant parties,
for determining the permissible scope of protection, and for deciding
whether a protective order is actually necessary. At the same time, the
Halkin test permits courts to use their sound discretion in deciding
whether to issue protective orders.
V. CONCLUSION
The civil discovery process embodied in the Federal Rules grants
litigants liberal access to information held by their opponents. Rule
26(c) empowers the courts to protect parties from being unnecessarily
injured by this judicially created and administered access system. Pro-
tective orders restricting dissemination of discovery information are a
useful means of affording necessary protection in the proper circum-
stances. These orders, however, implicate first amendment interests by
restricting the expression of the party against whom they are issued.
Prior to In re Halkin,198 the courts that addressed the issue of the
first amendment's impact on the availability of protective orders em-
ployed confficting and inconsistent approaches. The Halkin court cor-
rectly concluded that a party in litigation retains the first amendment
right to disseminate discovery information. The doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions supports this conclusion; it indicates that the power of
courts to deny discovery altogether does not immunize protective or-
ders from first amendment scrutiny.
196. See Brink v. DaLesio, 82 F.R.D. 664, 677 (D. Mo. 1979) ("Although Judge Bazelon's
criteria may have created a jurisprudential controversy, there is still a fair amount of judicial
flexibility and freedom in determining the variables which must flesh out his approach").
197. See text accompanying notes 29-39 supra.
198. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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Nevertheless, the interests of the judicial system in a reasonable
and effective discovery system militate in favor of a balancing ap-
proach that permits protective orders prohibiting dissemination in ap-
propriate circumstances. Liberally construed, the three-part test set
forth in Halkin follows this kind of balancing approach. Read into rule
26(c)'s good cause requirement, the Halkin test provides for careful
consideration of the first amendment interests that arise in the context
of protective orders. At the same time, the Halkin test gives trial judges
wide discretion to decide whether or not to issue these orders.
Few courts have yet looked to the Halkin case for guidance in de-
termining whether there is good cause to issue a protective order
prohibiting dissemination. Given the strength of the first amendment
interest in dissemination, however, the courts should squarely confront
the constitutional implications of granting protective orders. Properly
interpreted, the Halkin test represents a useful set of guidelines for de-
termining whether the need for a protective order outweighs the in-
fringement of legitimate first amendment interests. Using the Halkin
test to determine if good cause exists will doubtless render it more diffi-
cult to obtain protective orders prohibiting dissemination than would a
test that ignores first amendment concerns. But the good cause balanc-
ing test would not render these useful judicial tools completely unavail-
able in regulating civil discovery. Instead, the valid interests of all
parties, as well as the interests of the judicial system, would recieve
proper consideration.
Donald J Rendall, Jr.
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